
The Elastic Duty of Judicial Neutrality
When a German court president warns against electing the main opposition, the state ministry conveniently considers it private conversation.

When does the head of a regional court cease to act as a judge and become a private citizen expressing a casual political opinion? In Baden-Württemberg, that transformation apparently requires nothing more than stepping slightly to the side of a conference podium.
The state’s Ministry of Justice, led by the CDU, recently clarified this elastic boundary following an inquiry from parliamentary representative Kurt Hermann. Late in September, Christoph Reichert, President of the Konstanz Regional Court, offered a public warning to voters in an interview with the Südkurier. Electing the Alternative for Germany (AfD), he asserted, would amount to accepting a direct loss of the rule of law.
For any observer operating under the classical doctrine that the judiciary ought to remain strictly aloof from party political combat, such an explicit directive to voters might seem troubling. The German Judiciary Act explicitly obliges judges to conduct themselves in a manner that preserves public confidence in their independence, even when engaging in political discourse.
Yet the ministry found no flaw in Reichert’s public intervention. According to the government's formal response, judges retain the basic right to express political views as long as special circumstances—such as overt bias or a heavy reliance on their official authority—do not jeopardize public trust. Reichert’s warning against the country's primary opposition party was categorized as a mere spontaneous interview rather than an official statement of his office.
The surrounding circumstances test the limits of that interpretation. The interview occurred during the 71st Bodenseejuristentreffen, a conference gathering roughly 180 legal professionals from four nations. The venue was the Stadttheater in Konstanz, where former Federal Court of Justice President Bettina Limperg delivered a keynote address concerning the defense of the legal order against political interference.
Crucially, the event was co-organized by the very court Reichert leads, alongside the local lawyers’ association. Reichert himself opened the event with an official welcome to the assembled delegates. To suggest that a court president, standing at an event sponsored by his own institution, magically sheds his official persona the moment a reporter turns on a microphone requires a remarkable level of administrative imagination.
This selective tolerance points to a broader pattern within German governance. When high-ranking civil servants and judicial authorities use their positions to castigate the opposition, the political establishment demonstrates extraordinary benevolence in interpreting neutrality mandates. When the ruling parties feel challenged, the boundaries between state authority and partisan commentary dissolve into technicalities.
Public trust in an independent judiciary relies on the consistent enforcement of impartiality. If state ministries routinely excuse political interventions by court presidents whenever the target happens to be the opposition, the principle of judicial restraint quickly becomes an empty administrative gesture.
Written by Thomas Nussbaumer thomas.nussbaumer@alpineweekly.com




