The High Price of Syrian Restraint

When Israeli forces shelled a hilltop near Beit Jinn and conducted raids in Quneitra province, the response from Damascus was tellingly absent. Even after Israeli fighter jets battered the Abu al-Duhur military base in northern Syria—allegedly to block a Turkish deployment that both Damascus and Ankara deny—the Syrian government limited itself to diplomatic protests. For the new administration of Ahmed al-Sharaa, turning the other cheek is not an exercise in pacifism, but a calculated wager that balance sheets matter more than military bravado.

The reality on the ground offers little choice. Following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s army in late 2024, the new regime inherited broken institutions and a fragmented security landscape composed of various armed groups. According to World Bank estimates, restoring Syria’s shattered physical infrastructure will require $216 billion. Firing missiles back across the southern border does not generate electricity, open international credit lines, or rebuild bombed factories. Damascus needs functioning administration and foreign capital, not an unwinnable war of attrition.

To that end, al-Sharaa’s focus on economic rehabilitation has yielded tangible diplomatic dividends. Washington dismantled its broad sanctions framework in 2025 and officially removed Syria from its State Sponsors of Terrorism list on August 24. The European Union similarly removed its umbrella economic sanctions, though true to form, European bureaucrats made sure to retain a layer of targeted security restrictions. While Washington criticised the Abu al-Duhur strike, Damascus understands that its fragile return to global financial networks depends entirely on avoiding a major regional escalation that would spook foreign investors.

Yet this enforced restraint hands Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu precisely the tactical opening he desires. Deeply wary of a Syrian government led by figures emerging from an armed Islamist background and alarmed by Damascus's military ties with Turkiye, Israel has pushed far beyond border security. Netanyahu has demanded the total demilitarisation of Quneitra, Deraa, and Suwayda provinces, while insisting that Syria’s newly formed army stay north of Damascus. For Israel, these strikes and demands represent preventive security; for Syria, they represent an untenable squeeze on basic state sovereignty.

This strategic paralysis also carries acute domestic risks. A 2025 survey by the Arab Center Washington DC showed that 88 percent of Syrians view Israel as a security threat, 74 percent oppose official recognition, and 70 percent reject any deal omitting the return of the Golan Heights. Though 61 percent of respondents acknowledged that current foreign policy reflects public sentiment, endurance has its limits. If al-Sharaa's economic pivot fails to eventually secure territorial integrity and strategic autonomy, a population accustomed to decades of anti-Israel rhetoric may conclude that restraint looks suspiciously like surrender.

Written by Thorben Thiede thorben.thiede@alpineweekly.com