The EU's Balkan Overture: New Momentum or Just New Packaging?

From a fancy hotel on the Montenegrin coast, the European Union has once again declared its enlargement process to have real momentum. European Council chief António Costa, speaking at the EU-Western Balkans summit, projected confidence that the long-stalled expansion into the region was back on track. One could be forgiven for a sense of déjà vu. For two decades, Balkan accession has been a story of missed deadlines and broken promises. Is this time any different?

The immediate cause for optimism comes from Hungary’s decision to lift its veto on opening formal accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova. This move has certainly improved the mood in Brussels, allowing Mr. Costa to claim a victory over what he saw as blackmail from Budapest. Ukraine is now expected to begin the first set of negotiations this month. The details of the deal struck between Kyiv and Budapest over the rights of the Hungarian minority remain conveniently vague, but for now, the process moves forward.

To demonstrate that enlargement is not merely a geopolitical reaction to war in the east, the EU can point to Montenegro. The small, pro-European NATO member is firmly on course for a 2028 accession. Its admission would be a relatively straightforward affair, an easy political win for Brussels to signal that the door is not, in fact, closed. As Montenegro’s prime minister put it, his country is the “cookie of the Balkans”—a tempting sample to encourage an appetite for more.

But the main course remains fraught with difficulty. The case of Serbia highlights the deep-seated challenges that proclamations of momentum cannot erase. President Aleksandar Vučić continues his delicate balancing act between the EU, China, and Russia, a policy that is wearing thin in Western capitals. German Chancellor Merz stated plainly that “Serbia must clearly define where this country sees its future.” The country has not opened a single new negotiating chapter since 2021, with the Commission citing serious backsliding on judicial independence and media freedom. Brussels knows it cannot ignore Serbia due to its size and strategic position, but it also has no effective leverage to force a decision.

Faced with this impasse, a new philosophy appears to be taking shape. Mr. Costa acknowledged the accession process needs to be simplified. This echoes a Franco-German proposal for a “more structured gradual integration.” The concept is simple: candidate countries would unlock access to parts of the single market and other EU perks as they complete reforms, rather than waiting for full membership. It is a pragmatic, if less inspiring, vision. Interestingly, Albania’s Edi Rama and Serbia’s Vučić floated a similar idea themselves, suggesting they might trade full membership rights for a quicker seat at the table.

Meanwhile, local politics continue to present their own challenges. In Albania, Prime Minister Rama is consumed with defending a luxury resort project linked to the Kushner-Trump family, which has sparked protests. He dismisses the opposition as a “hybrid attack” fueled by antisemitism and hostile foreign powers. Such episodes are a reminder that while Brussels debates institutional architecture, candidate countries are grappling with complex, often messy, domestic realities.

The renewed push for enlargement is undeniable, but its engine is raw geopolitics, not a sudden burst of reformist zeal in the Balkans or bureaucratic efficiency in Brussels. The rules of the game are changing because the old ones failed. Montenegro may be a welcome success story, but it is the exception. The fundamental problem of how to integrate a country like Serbia, which refuses to choose a side, remains entirely unsolved.

Written by Sandy van Dongen sandy.vandongen@alpineweekly.com