The Balkan Paradox Brussels Prefers to Ignore

The technocrats in Brussels love to talk about merit-based integration, yet their actions routinely suggest otherwise. Nowhere is this contradiction more evident than in the Western Balkans, where Montenegro is quietly doing its homework while its far larger neighbour, Serbia, looks on with visible irritation. Podgorica has established itself as the frontrunner for European Union accession, leaving Belgrade caught in a self-inflicted limbo between East and West.

For Belgrade, watching Podgorica approach the finish line is an unwelcome reality check. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić made his displeasure clear when he skipped the twentieth anniversary of Montenegrin independence in May, dismissing the event as an insult to Serbs. A month later, at the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Tivat, Vučić cited alleged intelligence warnings regarding Montenegrin criminal clans to manufacture drama. These public theatrics reflect deeper anxieties: if Montenegro secures membership, Serbia’s claim to regional preeminence crumbles, forcing Belgrade to confront its own stagnating accession process. Eight member states recently blocked Serbia’s progress, leaving Cluster 3 closed despite five separate recommendations from the European Commission.

To protect its shrinking sphere of influence, Belgrade relies on domestic proxies and culture-war provocations inside Montenegro, where ethnic Serbs comprise roughly a third of the population. Pro-Serb political elements have pushed to enshrine Serbian as an official language in the constitution, attempted to strip an anti-fascist name from Podgorica's National Library, and tried to overturn Montenegro's recognition of Kosovo at the municipal level.

Yet these maneuvers have largely failed to break Podgorica’s momentum. Montenegro’s political class has demonstrated rare cohesion. In July, 74 of 77 lawmakers voted to initiate constitutional reforms. By late August, the parliament finalized those amendments with a two-thirds majority of 68 votes, isolating the hard-line pro-Serb opposition.

Rather than rewarding this discipline, Brussels finds itself trapped in its own geopolitical engineering. Certain EU member states, reluctant to leave Serbia behind, have sought to artificially link Belgrade's stalled application to Ukraine’s accession trajectory. Meanwhile, Serbian officials point to Montenegro’s crime syndicates and language policies, complaining that the process favors Podgorica unfairly. Danijel Apostolović, Serbia’s Ambassador to the EU, defended Belgrade's record by stating, Our focus is on our own reform process and economic growth.

Whether the European Union can manage an asymmetrical enlargement without bending to Belgrade's obstruction exposes the fundamental flaw of an institution that prioritizes administrative balance over actual reform. If Podgorica maintains its internal consensus, Brussels will eventually have to decide whether its own rules still mean anything, or if candidate countries are merely pawns in an endless bureaucratic exercise.

Written by Martina Kirchner martina.kirchner@alpineweekly.com